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Abstract—Link and node failures are common two fundamen-
tal problems that affect operational networks. Hence, protec-
tion of communication networks is essential to increase their
reliability, performance, and operations. Much research work
has been done to protect against link and node failures, and
to provide reliable solutions based on pre-defined provision or
dynamic restoration of the domain. In this paper we develop
network protection strategies against multiple link failures using
network coding and joint capacities. In these strategies, the
source nodes apply network coding for their transmitted data
to provide backup copies for recovery at the receivers’ nodes.
Such techniques can be applied to optical, IP, and mesh net-
works. The encoding operations of protection codes are defined
over finite fields. Furthermore, the normalized capacity of the
communication network is given by (n − t)/n in case of t link
failures. In addition, a bound on the minimum required field size
is derived.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increase in the capacity of backbone networks,
the failure of a single link or node can result in the loss
of enormous amounts of information, which may lead to
catastrophes, or at least loss of revenue. Network connections
are therefore provisioned with the property that they can
survive such failures, and hence several techniques have been
introduced in the literature. Such techniques either add extra
resources, or reserve some of the available network resources
as backup circuits, just for the sake of recovery from failures.
Recovery from failures is also required to be agile in order
to minimize the network outage time. This recovery usually
involves two steps: fault diagnosis and location, and rerouting
connections. Hence, the optimal network survivability problem
is a multi-objective problem in terms of resource efficiency,
operation cost, and agility [9].
In network survivability, the four different types of failures
that might affect network operations are [7], [10]: 1) link
failure, 2) node failure, 3) shared risk link group (SRLG)
failure, and 4) network control system failure. Henceforth,
one needs to design network protection strategies against these
types of failures. Although the common frequent failures are
link failures, node failures sometimes happen due to burned
swritch/router, fire, or any other hardware damage. In addition,
the failure might be due to network maintenance.
Network coding allows the intermediate nodes not only
to forward packets using network scheduling algorithms, but
also encode/decode them using algebraic primitive operations,
see [1], [3], [4], [8] and the references therein. As an ap-
plication of network coding, data loss because of failures in
communication links can be detected and recovered if the
sources are allowed to perform network coding operations.
Recently, network protection strategies against multiple link
failures using network coding and reduced capacities are
proposed in [2], [5]. In this paper, we provide a new technique
for protecting network failures using protection codes and
reduced capacity in which the encoding operations are defined
over finite fields. This technique can be deployed at an overlay
layer in optical mesh networks, in which detecting failure is
an essential task. The benefits of this approach are that:
i) It allows receivers to recover the lost data without con-
tacting a third parity or main domain server.
ii) It has less computational complexity and does not require
adding extra paths.
iii) All n disjoint paths have full capacity except at t paths
in case of protecting against t link failures.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sections II and III
we present the network model and problem definition. In
Section IV we provide network protections against t link
failures. We present differentiated distributed capacities in
Section VI, and demonstrate analysis of protection codes in
Section VII. Finally, Bounds on the finite field size is proved
in Section V, and the paper is concluded in Section VIII.
II. NETWORK MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this section we introduce the network model and provide
the needed assumptions. The main hypothesis of this network
model can be stated as follows.
i) Let N be a network represented by an abstract graph
G = (V, E), where V is the set of nodes and E be set
of undirected edges. Let S and R are sets of independent
sources and destinations, respectively. The set V = V ∪
S∪R contains the relay nodes, sources, and destinations.
Assume for simplicity that |S| = |R| = n, hence the set
of sources is equal to the set of receivers.
ii) The node can be a router, switch, or an end terminal
depending on the network model N and the transmission
layer.
iii) L is a set of links L = {L1, L2, . . . , Ln} carrying the data
from the sources to the receivers as shown in Fig. 1. All
connections have the same bandwidth, otherwise a con-
nection with high bandwidth can be divided into multiple
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Fig. 1. Network protection against a single path failure using reduced
capacity and network coding. One path out of n primary paths carries encoded
data. The black points represent various other relay nodes
connections, each of which has a unit capacity. There are
exactly n connections. For simplicity, we assume that the
number of sources is less than or equal to the number
of links. A sender with a high capacity can divide its
capacity into multiple unit capacity, each of which has its
own link. Put differently,
{(si, w1i), (w1i, w2i), . . . , (w(λ)i, ri)}, (1)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n and (w(j−1)i, wji) ∈ E, for some
integer λ ≥ 1. Hence we have |S| = |R| = |L| = n. The
n connection paths are pairwise link disjoint.
iv) The data from all sources are sent in cycles. Each cycle
has a number of time slots n. Hence tδj is a value at round
time slot j in cycle δ.
v) The failure on a link Li may happen due to the network
circumstance such as a link replacement, overhead, etc.
We assume that the receiver is able to detect a failure and
our protection strategy is able to recover it.
vi) In this model N , consider only a single link failure, it is
sufficient to apply the encoding and decoding operation
over a finite field with two elements, we denote it F2 =
{0, 1}.
III. PROBLEM SETUP AND TERMINOLOGY
We assume that there is a set of n connections that need to
be protected with %100 guaranteed against single and multiple
link failures. We assume that all connections have the same
bandwidth, and each link (one hop or circuit) has the same
bandwidth as a path.
Every sender si prepares a packet packetsi→ri to send to
a receiver ri. The packet contains the sender’s ID, data xℓi ,
and a round time for every cycle tℓδ for some integers δ and
ℓ. There are two types of packets:
i) Plain Packets: Packets sent without coding, in which the
sender does not need to perform any coding operations.
For example, in case of packets sent without coding, the
sender si sends the following packet to the receiver ri.
packetsi→ri := (IDsi , x
ℓ
i , t
ℓ
δ) (2)
ii) Encoding Packets: Packets sent with encoded data, in
which the sender sj sends other sender’s data. In this
case, the sender sj sends the following packet to receiver
rj :
packetsj→rj := (IDsj ,
n∑
i=1,j 6=i
αix
ℓ
i , t
ℓ
δ), (3)
where αi ∈ Fq.
In either case the sender has a full capacity in the connection
link Li.
Definition 1: The capacity of a connecting link Li between
si and ri is defined by
ci =
{
1, Li has active signals;
0, otherwise. (4)
And the total capacity is given by the summation of all link
capacities. What we mean by an active link is that the receiver
is able to receiver un-encoded signals/messages throughout
this link and process them.
Clearly, if all links are active then the total capacity is n and
normalized capacity is 1. In general the normalized capacity
of the network for the active and failed links is computed by
CN =
1
n
n∑
i=1
ci. (5)
The following definition describes the working and protec-
tion paths between two network switches as shown in Fig. 1.
Definition 2: The working paths on a network with n
connection paths carry un-encoded traffic under normal oper-
ations. The Protection paths provide an alternate backup path
to carry encoded traffic. A protection scheme ensures that data
sent from the sources will reach the receivers in case of failure
incidences on the working paths.
IV. NPS-T: PROTECTING AGAINST t PATH FAILURES
In this section we present a network protection strategy
against t failures in optical networks. Assume the same
notations as shown in the previous sections hold. Assume also
that the total number of failures are t and they happen at
arbitrary t links.
Let m = ⌈n/t⌉, hence we have m rounds per cycle. The
encoding operations of NPS-T against t failures are shown in
Scheme (6). We can see that yℓ in general is given by
yℓ =
(j−1)t∑
i=1
aℓix
j−1
i +
n∑
i=jt+1
aℓix
j
i
for (j − 1)t+ 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ jt, 1 ≤ j ≤ n. (7)
The advantages of NPS-T approach is that
• The data is encoded and decoded online, and it will be
sent and received in different rounds. Once the receivers
detect failures, they are able to obtain a copy of the
lost data immediately without delay by querying the
neighboring nodes with unbroken working paths.
• The recovery is assured with %100. Since t paths will
carry encoded data, up to t failures can be recovered.
31 2 . . . j . . . m = ⌈n/t⌉
s1 → r1 y1 x11 . . . x
j−1
1 . . . x
m−1
1
s2 → r2 y2 x12 . . . x
j−1
2 . . . x
m−1
2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
st → rt yt x1t . . . x
j−1
t . . . x
m−1
t
st+1→rt+1 x1t+1 yt+1 . . . x
3
2t+1 . . . x
m−1
2t+1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
s2t → r2t x12t y2t . . . x
3
2t . . . x
m−1
2t
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
sjt+ℓ→rjt+ℓ x1jt+ℓ x
2
jt+ℓ . . . y
3
jt+ℓ . . . x
m−1
jt+ℓ
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
st(m−1)+1 → rt(m−1)+1 x
1
t(m−1)+1 x
2
t(m−1)+1 . . . x
j
t(m−1)+1 . . . yt(m−1)+1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
smt → rmt x1mt x
2
mt . . . x
j
mt . . . ymt
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
(6)
Fig. 2. The encoding Scheme of t link failures. m = ⌈n/t⌉, 1 ≤ j ≤ m and 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ t. t out of the n connections carry encoded data. The coefficients
are chosen over Fq , for q ≥ n− t+ 1.
• Using this strategy, no extra paths are needed. This will
make this approach more suitable for applications, in
which adding extra paths is not allowed.
• Since in real case scenarios, the number of failures is very
small in comparison to the number of working paths, the
NPS-T performs well.
• The encoding operations are linear, and the coefficients
of the variables xji are taken from a finite field with q ≥
n− t+ 1 elements.
Theorem 3: Let n be the total number of connections from
sources to receivers. The capacity of NPS-T strategy shown
in Scheme 6 against t path failures is given by
CN = (n− t)/(n) (8)
Lemma 4: The encoding Scheme (6) is optimal in terms of
max capacity.
One can not find a better encoding scheme against t link
failures rather than providing one protection path against one
failure. Indeed t protection paths are used to protect t link
failures and this is shown in Scheme (6).
A. Encoding Operations
Assume that each connection path Li (L) has a unit capacity
from a source si (S) to a receiver ri (R). The data sent from the
sources S to the receivers R is transmitted in rounds. Under
NPS-T, in every round n − t paths are used to carry new
data (xji ), and t paths are used to carry protected data units.
there are t protection paths. Therefore, to treat all connections
fairly, there will be n/t rounds in a cycle, and in each round
the capacity is given by n-t.
We consider the case in which all symbols xji belong to
the same round. The first t sources transmit the first encoded
data units y1, y2, . . . , yt, and in the second round, the next t
sources transmit yt+1, yt+2, . . . , y2t, and so on. All sources S
and receivers R must keep track of the round numbers. Let
IDsi and xsi be the ID and data initiated by the source si.
Assume the round time j in cycle δ is given by tjδ. Then
the source si will send packetsi on the working path which
includes
Packetsi = (IDsi , x
ℓ
i , t
ℓ
δ) (9)
Also, the source sj , that transmits on a protection path, will
send a packet packetsj :
Packetsj = (IDsj , yj, t
ℓ
δ), (10)
where yk is defined in (7). Hence the protection paths are used
to protect the data transmitted in round ℓ, which are included
in the xli data units. So, we have a system of t independent
equations at each round time that will be used to recover at
most t unknown variables.
The strategy NPS-T is a generalization of protecting against
a single path failure shown in the previous section in which
t protection paths are used instead of one protection path in
case of one failure. We also notice that most of the network
operations suffer from one and two path failures [10], [7].
B. Proper Coefficients Selection
One way to select the coefficients aℓj’s in each round such
that we have a system of t linearly independent equations is
by using the matrix H shown in (11). Let q be the order of a
finite field, and α be the root of unity. Then we can use this
4matrix to define the coefficients of the senders as:
H =


1 1 1 . . . 1
1 α α2 · · · αn−1
1 α2 α4 · · · α2(n−1)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 αt−1 α2(t−1) · · · α(t−1)(n−1)


. (11)
We have the following assumptions about the encoding oper-
ations.
1) Clearly if we have one failure t = 1, then all coefficients
will be one. The first sender will always choose the unit
value.
2) If we assume t failures, then the y1, y2, . . . , yt equations
are written as:
y1 =
n∑
i=t+1
x1i , y2 =
n∑
i=t+1
α(i−1)x2i , (12)
yj =
n∑
i=t+1
αi(j−1) mod (q−1)xℓi , (13)
This equation gives the general theme to choose the co-
efficients at any particular round in any cycle. However, the
encoded data yi’s are defined as shown in Equation (13). In
other words, for the first round in cycle one, the coefficients
of the plain data x1, x2, . . . , xt are set to zero.
C. Decoding Operations
We know that the coefficients aℓ1, aℓ2, . . . , aℓn are elements
of a finite field, hence the inverses of these elements exist and
they are unique. Once a node fails which causes t data units to
be lost, and once the receivers receive t linearly independent
equations, they can linearly solve these equations to obtain the
unknown t data units. At one particular cycle j, we have three
cases for the failures
i) All t link failures happened in the working paths, i.e. the
working paths have failed to convey the messages xℓi in
round ℓ. In this case, n− t equations will be received, t
of which are linear combinations of n− t data units, and
the remaining n− 2t are explicit xi data units, for a total
of n− t equations in n− t data units. In this case any t
equations (packets) of the t encoded packets can be used
to recover the lost data.
ii) All t link failures happened in the protection paths. In this
case, the exact remaining n-t packets are working paths
and they do not experience any failures. Therefore, no
recovery operations are needed.
iii) The third case is that the failure might happen in some
working and protection paths simultaneously in one par-
ticular round in a cycle. The recover can be done using
any t protection paths as shown in case i.
V. BOUNDS ON THE FINITE FIELD SIZE, Fq
In this section we derive lower and upper bound on the al-
phabet size required for the encoding and decoding operations.
In the proposed schemes we assume that direction connections
exist between the senders and receivers, which the information
can be exchanged with neglected cost.
The first result shows that the alphabet size required must be
greater than the number of connections that carry unencoded
data.
Theorem 5: Let n be the number of connections in the
network model N , then the receivers are able to decode the
encoded messages over Fq and will recover from t ≥ 2 path
failures if
q ≥ n− t+ 1. (14)
Also, if q = pr, then r ≤ ⌈logp(n + 1)⌉. The binary field is
sufficient in case of a single path failure.
Proof: We will prove the lower bound by construction.
Assume a NPS-T at one particular time tℓδ in the round ℓ in a
certain cycle δ. The protection code of NPS-T against t path
failures is given in 11.
Without loss of generality, the interpretation of Scheme (11)
is as follows:
i) The columns correspond to the senders S and rows
correspond to t encoded data y1, y2, . . . , yt.
ii) The first row corresponds to y1 if we assume the first
round in cycle one. Furthermore, every row represents
the coefficients of every senders at a particular round.
iii) The column i represents the coefficients of the sender si
through all protection paths L1, L2, . . . , Lt.
iv) Any element αi ∈ Fq appears once in a column and
row, except in the follow column and first row, where all
elements are one’s.
v) All columns (rows) are linearly independent.
Due to the fact that the t failures might occur at any t
working paths of L = {l1, L2, . . . , ln}, then we can not predict
the t protection paths as well. This means that t out of the
n columns do not participate in the encoding coefficients,
because t paths will carry encoded data. We notice that
removing any t out of the n columns in Scheme (11) will result
to n− t linearly independent columns. Therefore the smallest
finite field that satisfies this condition must have n − t + 1
elements.
The upper bound comes from the case of no failures, hence
q ≥ (n + 1). Assume q is a prime power , then the result
follows.
if q = 2r, then in general the previous bound can be stated
as
n− t+ 1 ≤ q ≤ 2⌈log2(n+1)⌉. (15)
The following result shows the maximum admissible paths,
which can suffer from failures, and the decoding operations
can be achieved successfully.
Lemma 6: Let n and t be the number of connections and
failures in the network model N , then we have t ≤ ⌊n/2⌋.
Proof: The proof is a direct consequence and from the
fact that the protection paths must be less than or equal to the
number of working paths.
This lemma shows that one can not provide protection paths
better than duplicating the number of working paths.
VI. NETWORK PROTECTION USING DISTRIBUTED
CAPACITIES AND NETWORK CODING
In this section we develop network protection strategy where
some connection paths have high priorities (less bandwidth,
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high demand). Let n be the set of available connections
(disjoint paths from sources to receivers). Let m be the set
of rounds in every cycle. In the previous strategies (NPS-T)
we assumed that all connection paths have the same priority
demand and working capacities. This might be the real case
scenario. connections that carry applications with multimedia
traffic have high priority than applications that carry data
traffic. Therefore, it is required to design network protection
strategies based on the traffic and sender priorities.
Consider that available working connections n may use their
bandwidth assignments in asymmetric ways. Some connec-
tions are less demanding in terms of bandwidth requirements
than other connections that require full capacity frequently.
Therefore connections with less demanding can transmit more
protection packets, while other connections demand more
bandwidth, and can therefore transmit fewer protection packets
throughout transmission rounds. Let m be the number of
rounds and tδi be the time of transmission in a cycle δ at round
i. For a particular cycle i, let t be the number of protection
paths against t failures that might affect the working paths.
We will design network protection strategy against t arbitrary
link failures (NPS-T2) as follows. Let the source sj sends di
data packets and pi protection packets such that dj +pj = m.
Put differently:
n∑
i=1
(di + pi) = nm (16)
In general we do not assume that di = dj and pi = pj . NPS-
T2 is described as shown in Scheme 17.
The encoded data yℓi is given by
yℓi =
n∑
k=1,yℓ
k
6=yℓj
xℓk (18)
We assume that the maximum number of failures that might
occur in a particular cycle is t. Hence the number of protection
paths (paths that carry encoded data) is t. The selection of the
working and protection paths in every round is done using
a priority demanding function at the senders’s side. It will
also depend on the traffic type and service provided on these
protection and working connections.
In Scheme (17) every connection i is used to carry di un-
encoded data x1i , x2i , . . . , x
di
i (working paths) and pi encoded
data y1i , y2i , . . . , y
pi
i (protection paths) such that di + pi = m.
Lemma 7: Let t be the number of connection paths car-
rying encoded data in every round in NPS-T2, then the
normalized network capacity CN is given by
(n− t)/n (19)
Proof: The proof is straight forward from the fact that
t protection paths exist in every round, hence n − t working
paths are available throughout all m rounds.
VII. ANALYSIS OF THE PROTECTION CODES OVER Fq
We will prove correctness of the protection codes over Fq .
Let Fq be a finite field with q elements such that q = pr for
some nonzero integer r and prime p. We will drive a scheme
to recover from any m failures in the n + m primary and
protection paths. Assume t be the number of failures in the
primary paths. We have three cases
i) All failures occur in the primary paths, t = m. In this case
we need to establish a system of t linearly independent
equations in t variables.
ii) t failures occur in the primary paths and m − t failures
occur in the protection paths. In this case we need to
establish a system of equations to recover the failures in
the primary paths only.
iii) All failures occur in the protection paths. No recovery
process is needed in this case.
We will show the encoding operation in case of directional
connections from the senders to receivers. consider the worst
case scenario in which m = t. We can describe the encoding
scheme for multiple link failures as shown in (11).
All α’s powers are taken module the field size, i.e.
αij mod q=n+1. In other words, if q ≥ n + 1, then we have
the encoding matrix


1 1 1 · · · 1
α α2 α3 · · · αn
α2 α4 α6 · · · α2(n)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
αt−1 α2(t−1) α3(t−1) · · · α(t−1)(n)


(20)
In this case we have αq−1 = 1, q is a prime power.
The first column represents the coefficients of the encoding
data at the first sender. Also, the first row represents the binary
coefficients of all senders in case of a single link failure. Hence
αi−1 column represents the coefficients of the encoding data
at the i sender for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
In general for multiple m = t failures, the encoding data in
the j-th protection is given by
yn+j =
n∑
i=1
αj(i−1) mod qxi, (21)
for 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
As a matter of fact, the square sub-matrix of t columns of
the encoding scheme 20 is invertable (has a full rank) if and
only if its determinant is not equal to zero [6]. We will show
6that for any t arbitrary link failures, the receivers are able to
form a system of t linearly independent equations and recover
the lost data.
Lemma 8: If there are t link failures in the primary paths,
then the receivers are successfully able to recover from those
failures using t protection paths.
Proof: Let
[
1 αj1 α2j1 . . . α(t−1)j1
]
represent
the any arbitrary column in the encoding scheme (20) indexed
by the second element αj1 . Choosing any t arbitrary columns
αj1 , αj2 , . . . , αjt yield

1 1 . . . 1
αj1 αj2 . . . αjt
α2j1 α2j2 . . . α2jt
. . . . . . . . . . . .
α(t−1)j1 α(t−1)j2 . . . α(t−1)jt

 (22)
Hence we have a system of t equations in t variables. Clearly,
all elements in each row are different. Indeed this system has
determinant given by the form [6, Theorem 6.5.5]
αj1+j2+j3+...+jt
∏
h>ℓ
(
αjh − αjℓ
)
6= 0, (23)
which proves the result.
Now, we shall prove the general case that any µ×µ square
sub-matrix of the matrix (20) has a full rank. Assume the
square matrix is represented by
B =


αi1j1 αi1j2 · · · αi1jµ
αi2j1 αi2j2 · · · αi2jµ
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
αiµj1 αiµj2 · · · αiµjµ

 (24)
where 1 ≤ µ ≤ n and αii′ jj′ ∈ Fq .
Lemma 9: The sub-matrix B described in (24) has a full
rank.
Proof: We proceed the proof by mathematical induction.
i) We first prove that any 2 × 2 sub-matrix of B has a
full rank. It means that for any four elements lie in the
corner are not alike (do not share a common factor). Put
differently, i 6= j and ℓ 6= 1,[
αi αj
αℓi αℓj
]
(25)
If we divide the second row by α(1−ℓ)i, we obtain αi.
Now assume by contradiction that α(1−ℓ)i.αℓj = αj . Or
α(1−ℓ)i = α(1−ℓ)j mod q. Obviously, this contradicts the
fact that ℓ 6= 1 and i 6= j. In addition (l − 1)(j − i) = 0
mod q contradicts the fact about the field order. Hence,
the result is a consequence.
ii) Now, assume the matrix
Bµ−1 =


αi1j1 αi1j2 · · · αi1jµ−1
αi2j1 αi2j2 · · · αi2jµ−1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
αiµ−1j1 αiµ−1j2 · · · αiµ−1jµ−1

 (26)
has a full rank.
iii) We will add any arbitrary row and column to the matrix
Bµ−1 to construct the matrix B.
B =


αi1j1 αi1j2 · · · αi1jµ−1 αi1jµ
αi2j1 αi2j2 · · · αi2jµ−1 αi2jµ
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
αiµ−1j1 αiµ−1j2 · · · αiµ−1jµ−1 αiµ−1jµ
αiµj1 αiµj2 · · · αiµjµ−1 αiµjµ


(27)
All elements in the last columns are different, also all
elements in the last row are different. Since αiijj is an
element in Fq , it has a unique inverse. Therefore, we can
divide every row in the matrix B by the element in the
last column. Hence, we have
B′ =


αi
′
1
j′
1 αi
′
1
j′
2 · · · αi
′
1
j′µ−1 1
αi
′
2
j′
1 αi
′
2
j′
2 · · · αi
′
2
j′µ−1 1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
αi
′
µ−1j
′
1 αi
′
µ−1j
′
2 · · · αi
′
µ−1j
′
µ−1 1
αi
′
µj
′
1 αi
′
µj
′
2 · · · αi
′
µj
′
µ−1 1


(28)
All powers of α’s are taken module q. Furthermore, all
elements in each row (or column) are pairwise disjoint. The
matrix B′ is similar to the matrix shown in (22). Using
lemma 8, the matrix B′ has a full rank given by µ.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we demonstrated the encoding operations of
network protection codes defined over finite fields. We derived
a bound on the minimum field size required for choosing
unique coefficients of data sent on the working paths. In
addition we presented a scheme for differentiated services in
cases of some working paths have high priorities in terms of
bandwidth and capacity assignments.
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